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Paying ‘buckets of blood ’ for the
land:moral debates over economy,
war and state in Southern Sudan*
CHERRY LEONARDI
Department of History, Durham University, 43 North Bailey,
Durham DH1 3EX, UK
Email : d.c.leonardi@durham.ac.uk
A B S T R A C T
This paper challenges the prevailing focus on ethnic division and conﬂict in
Southern Sudan in recent years, demonstrating that even within ethnically divisive
debates over land, there are shared, transethnic levels of moral concern. These
concerns centre on the commodiﬁcation and monetisation of rural and kinship
resources, including human life itself, epitomised in ideas of land being bought
with blood, or blood being turned into money by the recent wartime economy.
It argues that the enduring popular ambivalence towards money derives not only
from its commonly observed individualising properties, but also from the historical
association of money with government. Southern Sudanese perceive historical
continuity in government consumption and corruption, and express concern at
the expansion of its alternative value system into rural economies during and
since the war. Whilst seeking to access money and government, they nevertheless
continue to employ a discursive but powerful dichotomy between the moral
worlds of state and kinship.
I N T R O D U C T I O N
They say, ‘nina dofu backat wela saﬁa ta dom : we have poured a bucket or tin of
blood, for this land’. They say it so that you get scared, because this person is a
‘ liberator ’.1
* This article is based on oral research in Central Equatoria, Lakes and Western Bahr el Ghazal
States between 2004 and 2010, together with archival and media sources. The research has been
funded by an AHRC studentship, the Leverhulme Trust, the British Institute in Eastern Africa, the
British Academy and consultancies with UNDP, the US Institute of Peace and the Rift Valley
Institute. It has beneﬁted greatly from comments on a much earlier conference paper in 2006 from
Øystein Rolandsen, Carol Berger and John Ryle, from conversations with Naseem Badiey, Leben
Nelson Moro and Rob Blunt, and from constructive suggestions on later drafts from Justin Willis,
Chris Vaughan, DavidMoon and Dave Eaton; its failings and opinions are of course the author’s own.
Thanks also to the editor and to the anonymous reviewers, particularly for the latter’s suggestions for
future research directions raised by aspects of the paper.
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Writing in 2004, as the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/
Army (SPLM/A) prepared to sign the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
(CPA) with the Sudanese government, Branch and Mampilly (2005)
drew attention to the lack of a uniﬁed Southern Sudanese identity and to a
‘rupture between the Dinka, dominant within the SPLA, and the
Equatorian peoples of the far south’.2 During the subsequent interim
period, international and Sudanese commentators have increasingly
focused on these and other ethnic divisions in media and agency reports,
leading some to question the viability of an independent Southern
Sudan, should its people vote for secession in the 2011 referendum.3
Commentators have also criticised corruption within the interim
Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS), and, by inference, the absence
of the ethnically inclusive civil governance structures advocated by
Branch and Mampilly. The latter emphasised the Dinka occupation of
land in the Equatoria region as a major ‘stumbling block’ to internal
peace and refugee returns. Since then, reports of tensions over land and
of tribal conﬂicts in many areas of Southern Sudan have only pro-
liferated.4
As the potential secession of Southern Sudan appears ever more likely,
this emphasis among analysts and reporters on ethnic division and tribalist
government needs to be urgently questioned. This paper argues that there
are deeper shared popular perceptions across the supposed Dinka–
Equatorian divide, on the basis of research conducted since 2004, primarily
in Dinka-speaking areas of Lakes State and Bari-speaking areas of Central
Equatoria State. Interviews, conversations and documentary sources, from
internet media to chiefs’ court records, inevitably revealed a great variety
of opinion, perspective, language and idiom; the paper does not claim
to represent a single, uncontested popular discourse. But it does suggest
that there are striking commonalities in social and moral concerns in
both states and among people of diﬀerent ages, genders, livelihoods and
lifestyles.
The paper argues that these common concerns centre on the commo-
diﬁcation and monetisation of productive and reproductive resources, in-
cluding human life itself, that have formed the basis of wealth and value
across Southern Sudan. Over the last century people have increasingly
sought out money and market resources, but the resulting debate and
competition within families and communities has reproduced a binary
distinction between the values of an idealised moral economy of kinship
and reciprocity, and the immoral, individualistic cultures of money and
town. As this paper shows, this moral dichotomy transcends ethnic divi-
sions, and underlies perceptions of government corruption and of the
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broader changes wrought by the political economy of the 1983–2004 war
and the subsequent interim period.
The paper uncovers this transethnic moral discourse, conversely, from
the starting point of ethnically divisive discourse about land in the
southernmost three states of Central, Western and Eastern Equatoria. The
fertile agricultural land of the central Equatoria Region is divided into
clan territories, within which plots have been allocated – not sold – to use
for cultivation. Many of the inhabitants ﬂed during the war; on their
return in recent years, they have found their former plots occupied by
soldiers, oﬃcials and displaced people (IDPs) from cattle-keeping regions
of Southern Sudan, commonly (but not always accurately) labelled as
Dinka. Some Equatorians report that the new occupants claimed to have
bought the land during wartime with the buckets or tins of their blood that
was shed upon it. On one level this might indicate a vivid expression of the
loss and suﬀering of the war and the resulting sense of entitlement among
soldiers and IDPs to a reward long promised by the SPLA leadership.
Equatorians tend to deploy and denounce the alleged claims in the context
of broader, bitter debates as to which ethnic groups or regions contributed
most to the liberation struggle.
But despite such ethnic politics, the paper argues that the rhetorical
emphasis on ‘buckets ’ and ‘tins ’ of blood in these debates over land re-
veals an intersection with the wider underlying moral concerns about the
encroachment of an urban, monetary economy, associated historically
with army and government, into rural economies. The English-derived
backat and the colloquial Arabic saﬁa are both used as speciﬁc units of
measurement for grain and other consumables in the markets of Southern
Sudan (e.g. GoSS 2008).5 To use them discursively as a measurement for
human blood is, the paper argues, a dramatic expression of the commo-
diﬁcation of human life by the war, something which is discussed beyond
Equatoria – often with similar rhetorical emphasis on ‘blood’ being sold,
paid or monetised.
The ﬁrst two sections of this paper explore the tensions over Equatorian
land in more detail. The third section addresses the paradoxes of the
discursive dichotomy between value systems that these debates reveal, and
the enduring capacity of rural moral discourse to regulate those who ap-
parently challenge its predominance. Individuals who have proﬁted from
monetary and military employment have gained patronage resources
outside the rural political economy, which uses idioms and structures of
patrilineal kinship to control productive resources like land and livestock.
Moral condemnation of money and towns by elders has therefore been
in part a reactive strategy to try to maintain the pre-eminence of
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lineage-based claims to authority and seniority. But this discursive tool
has retained power to regulate people’s behaviour because, as the mon-
etary economy has become increasingly dominant and penetrative, it has
also appeared ever more exclusive, predatory and unreliable. Most people
have had to fall back recurrently on the resources of family and rural
community, even as they aspire to participate in ‘development’ and the
urban economy. The paradoxical result is an enduring moral discourse
which simultaneously perpetuates a set of binary distinctions between
town and village, money and kinship, state and society, and yet impels the
expanding class of government employees and money-earners to cross
these divides and demonstrate that they are redistributing their income and
investing in social relations.
Anthropologists have examined similar moral dichotomies between
money and other forms of value, particularly in cattle-owning societies
in southern and eastern Africa (Broch-Due 1999; Ferguson 1985;
Hutchinson 1996; Shipton 1989). The focus of this paper is not, however,
on the speciﬁcities of the morally constituted economic barriers and con-
versions in particular livelihood groups. Instead it shows that locally vari-
able value systems nevertheless produce commonly shared perceptions of
the state and changing political economy. It therefore argues in its fourth
section that to fully understand the enduring popular ambivalence to-
wards money, we need to explore the historical association of money with
government, as well as with the alienability and individualism highlighted
by other studies. The ambivalence is shaped by opposition not just be-
tween genders, generations or livelihoods, but also between state and
society.
The simultaneous popular desire to exclude as well as to incorporate
money and government resources complicates notions of patrimonialism
and corruption, addressed in the ﬁnal part of the paper. Some political
analysts have explained government corruption and neopatrimonialism in
Africa as a mutated version of deeply rooted social norms and practices.
But Southern Sudanese discourse instead locates the corrupt practices of
government in an entirely separate moral economy whose history is traced
all the way back to the militarised commerce and enslavement of the
nineteenth century. In this context, the expansion since the 1970s of
government employment, military recruitment, urban settlement and the
monetary economy is generating profound and disturbing questions.
Beneath the apparently ‘ tribal ’ conﬂicts over land, there are shared fears
about the disrupting eﬀects of these trends on social relations and pro-
ductive economies, and a continuing desire to preserve a distance from the
state.
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L A N D A N D L I B E R A T I O N
Many former inhabitants of the Equatorian states claim to have returned
from wartime displacement to ﬁnd their plots or clan territories occupied
by soldiers or internally displaced people (IDPs), who declare : ‘ I fought
and liberated, I bought this land with my blood. ’ Equatorian politicians,
journalists and commentators publicly denounce this as a distortion of the
SPLA’s broader struggle to defend the land of Southern Sudan. A meeting
of the state governors and county commissioners of Greater Equatoria in
2007 recorded: ‘We sadly note that the term ‘‘ land-grabbing’’ has come
into currency due to the faulty interpretation of why we made sacriﬁces in
over 22 years ’ (Lokuji 2007).
Analysts are increasingly recognising the issue of land access and rights
not only as a root cause of Sudan’s civil wars, but also as a vital determi-
nant of the success or failure of the continuing peace process in Southern
Sudan (Johnson 2003, 2009; Pantuliano 2007). As Johnson (2009: 176)
emphasises, alienation of land by government was the greatest common
grievance among the marginalised people of Sudan by the time the CPA
was signed in 2005. Having long claimed to be ﬁghting to redress this, the
SPLM/A has repeatedly asserted that ‘ land belongs to the community’.
But the CPA, interim constitutions and GoSS legislation have remained
vague regarding customary land rights (Badiey 2010; Deng 2010;
Rolandsen 2009). Conﬂicts, tensions and divisions within Southern Sudan
have increasingly centred on land and territorial disputes. As recent re-
ports ﬁnd, the rhetoric of administrative decentralisation together with
resource competition has led to the conﬂation of ethnic territory with local
government units, and given heightened signiﬁcance to the boundaries
between them (Rolandsen 2009; Schomerus & Allen 2010).
Unprecedented levels of urbanisation since the CPA have generated
particular tensions as towns expand into formerly rural areas of communal
territorial rights. Some SPLM leaders have warned that GoSS could legally
acquire such ‘ tribally-held land’, particularly around the capital, Juba
(Badiey 2010: 251–5). Access to urban land holdings has always been
governed on an entirely diﬀerent basis from rural land rights, by the in-
dividual monetary purchase of leasehold and by privileged access to the
government oﬃces that distribute leases. Historically, the land on which
towns are situated was expropriated by government, and any prior in-
habitants were forcibly relocated, leaving lingering resentment and a sense
of entitlement among their descendants. The land has then been leased
primarily to government employees, licensed traders and retired soldiers.
As urban populations have swelled in recent decades, particularly with
returning refugees and IDPs unaccustomed to rural life, the commercial
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value of urban land has rapidly increased,making it a potential government
patronage resource (Pantuliano et al. 2008: 29–32). Oﬃcial land leases
have remained beyond the reach of most ordinary people, leaving urban
populations vulnerable to evictions and demolitions (Gatdet Dak 2009;
Deng 2010). The commodiﬁcation of land has thus largely been experi-
enced as a threat to the land access of poor or average households, and as
indicative of the alien, arbitrary ways of the hakuma (government).
In the Equatorian states, urban expansion has been further complicated
by the wider tensions over immigration during and since the war from
other states in Southern Sudan. Many Equatorians accuse GoSS or the
SPLA of failing to protect the land rights of indigenous communities, and
of actively participating in the seizure of land in and around the towns,
particularly Juba.6 The struggle over land has become entangled in wider
political and military divisions along broadly ethnic lines (Branch &
Mampilly 2005). There are bitter debates between and among those who
fought, stayed or ﬂed during the war as to who contributed most or least to
the liberation struggle. Some Equatorians interpreted the depredations of
the SPLA from the 1980s as acts of occupation or revenge by a Dinka
army, rather than as ‘ liberation’ (Johnson & Prunier 1993: 127 ; Johnson
2003: 67–70).7 Privately, some admit that ‘even our own boys’ in the
SPLA were responsible for the military depredations. Indeed, across
Southern Sudan, civilians shared the traumatic experiences of the military
presence, regardless of ethnicity (see Hutchinson 2001). But the ethnic
tensions also derived from the earlier fears of ‘Dinka domination’ that had
been stirred up by Khartoum and some Southern politicians during the
Southern Regional Government (1972–83).8
Both in the 1970s–80s and more recently, political and military divisions
have intersected with competition for land. Much of the central part of
Equatoria is a fertile middle ground valuable for both cattle-keeping and
cultivation, between the south-western forests, and the ﬂoodplains to the
north.9 The tensions are often presented as inevitable conﬂict between
pastoralist Dinka and agriculturalist Equatorians, another simpliﬁcation
since Dinka also grow crops, and many Equatorians possess cattle. The
situation was complicated by population displacement during the wars : as
Equatorians took refuge in neighbouring countries, IDPs from other
regions moved south into Equatoria. The conﬂict for land became closely
merged with perceptions of SPLA occupation when oﬃcers and soldiers
took over valuable plots in and around Equatorian towns from the 1990s
onwards (de Wit 2004). For the local population, these appropriations
seemed to conﬁrm a threatening conspiracy among soldiers, IDPs
and herders to take over Equatorian territory (Schomerus 2008).
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Unsurprisingly, there has been considerable resistance to the expansion of
Juba town from the local Bari (Badiey 2010), as well as continuing tensions
elsewhere in the Equatorian states between long-term displaced settle-
ments and returning indigenes.
The conﬂation of military appropriations with displaced settlement is
particularly apparent in the reported claims to land based on ‘blood’,
which became more prominent from 2005, as Equatorians advocated a
post-CPA exodus of IDPs back to their homelands. Equatorians reported
that displaced ‘Dinka’ were claiming that ‘ they can’t leave because they
have shed blood to obtain this land’ ; ‘ their blood was spilled in the area
and therefore they have the right to stay’ (Juba Post 15–22.5.2005,
8.2.2008). Blood became a vivid rhetorical device for denouncing the in-
ference that Equatorians had contributed less to the SPLA struggle :
If a Kakwa10 said ‘ this is my place or my plot ’, others claim that a payment of
blood is needed. Whose blood? You have your own blood and I have mine. Then
whose blood should that Kakwa give you? I think all of us in South Sudan
sacriﬁced … The Kakwa people are not cowards.
Lo-Lumori 2006
Another Central Equatorian journalist and politician developed this
question further, arguing that those who claimed the land were doing so
on the dubious moral basis of the blood of their dead relatives :
These ones say their blood settled here ; they are the liberators ; there is a tin of
blood poured there. But whose blood?! The one who died should claim the land!
Not you on their behalf … That thing of blood is being used for personal gains.
Politician 1 int.
Such explicit references to blood have been recorded only in alleged
quotation by Equatorians ; the new claims to land tend to be articulated
publicly in more general terms of a reward owed to the liberation ﬁghters.
Why then might these Equatorians lay such stress on the attributed claim
of a ‘payment’ of blood in ‘ tins ’ or ‘buckets ’? Such obvious references to
the commodiﬁcation of human life intersect with multiple layers of con-
cern and debate, one of which, as we have seen, is the attempt to measure
ethnic/regional contributions to the SPLA war and convert these into
material reward. But the condemnation of the use of wartime bloodshed
for personal gain resonates with moral discourse across Southern Sudan,
as the later part of the paper will show. Firstly though, the discourse touches
on complex debates over land rights at a more local level, which in turn
connect with wider concern at the commodiﬁcation of rural and kinship
resources.
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B L O O D O N T H E L A N D
Within and beyond contests over land, Equatorians do not dispute that the
war has left blood lying on the soil, but, like many other Southerners, they
depict this as a form of pollution: as a Kuku chief explained, ‘much rima
[blood] was shed during the war, and the land has been polluted; it requires
cleansing’.11 The chiefs of displaced Equatorian communities resident in
Juba also describe the need to cleanse the land of blood before they return
to live in former battleﬁelds :
When we return we will need to slaughter a bull and eat it and praise God for our
coming back. The blood of those killed there will be cleared because of this bull
and no problems will come to us.
Chief 1 int.
Other informants advocated such rituals and recalled comparable blood-
cleansing sacriﬁces during their childhoods in the village (Professors 1 &
2 int. ; Politician 2 int.), suggesting that the discourse of blood and land
involves a complex interplay of cultures and languages ; at one level, the
politicians and ‘ intellectuals ’ are debating globalised notions of blood, soil
and sacriﬁce, but at a local level communities also draw on indigenous
understandings of these notions and means of contesting them. If people
are indeed claiming land on the basis of wartime bloodshed, this could
similarly indicate cultural parallels with particular kinds of cattle sacriﬁce,
which assert ancestral ownership of the land on which sacriﬁcial blood is
shed (e.g. Burton 1983; Lienhardt 1961: 295; Zanen & van den Hoek 1987:
190).12 The articulation of vernacular and (inter)national concepts of
sacriﬁce and blood is beyond the scope of this article, but there are two
particular points which complicate these comparisons.
Firstly, Dinka informants insist that none of their multiple vernacular
words for sacriﬁce could be applied straightforwardly to the human blood-
shed of the war. Despite the frequently observed commensurability of
human and cattle lives and blood among, most famously, the Nuer
(Hutchinson 1996), anthropologists have also emphasised the ambiguous
and potentially polluting qualities of human blood, distinct from the
cleansing or life-giving properties of sacriﬁcial animal blood (Evans-
Pritchard 1956: 213–20; Buxton 1973: 211–12; cf. White 1997: 439–40).
Death in a Bor Dinka cattle-camp required ‘washing away the blood of
the dead body’ (Zanen & van den Hoek 1987: 182). As Hutchinson (2001 :
326) shows, the SPLA war may have seen the renegotiation of ideas about
blood pollution, but Nuer and Dinka have also expressed unease at the
spiritual consequences of the human bloodshed of the war. The desire to
cleanse blood from the land may therefore reﬂect deeper and wider
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spiritual concerns than is apparent from the political rhetoric over land
in Equatoria. A sense of crisis over deaths from suspected witchcraft
and poison in Kajokeji, for example, is attributed to the blood on the
soil undermining the power of spiritual land-chiefs to curse evil-doers
(Moro, pers. comm. 2010). Shortages of rain in Western Bahr el Ghazal
State in 2009 were also explained similarly by Fertit communities : ‘People
are saying the lack of rain is because of the war and all the blood that
was spilled on the ground. This blood is a very terrible thing’ (Returnee
int.).
Secondly, sacriﬁces connected with ownership of territory are pre-
dicated speciﬁcally on ‘ﬁrst-comer’ rights (Burton 1983). While the right of
non-Equatorians to settle in Equatoria is generally articulated publicly by
soldiers and political spokesmen in terms of national citizenship rights
or the liberation struggle, at the local level settlers have on occasion
employed a more indigenous concept of rights to unused land, claiming
that the land was unoccupied when they arrived (Badiey 2010: 334–7;
Schomerus & Allen 2010: 23). At this level, Equatorian and immigrant
groups may be debating within a shared discourse and employing animal
sacriﬁce and other rituals as idioms in which to assert land ownership.
One Juba District chief claimed that several Nuer soldiers had been killed
in an accident because they had wrongly sacriﬁced cattle on his com-
munity’s land (Chief 2 int.). Some Equatorians perhaps deliberately focus
instead then on the ‘buckets of blood’ claims precisely because these do not
rest on an indigenous logic of autochthony or ﬁrst settlement, and so can
be more easily repudiated. But the desire to reassert the rights of land-
owning clan leaders, often enacted through rituals and sacriﬁces, is also
part of a broader rigidiﬁcation of deﬁnitions of community, in terms both
of the territorial and administrative boundaries mentioned above, and of
eﬀorts to strengthen patrilineal structures and authorities in the face of
perceived threats.
Beneath the current land contest, there are shared cultural principles of
ancestral, patrilineal land rights. Both Equatorian and Dinka oral histories
idealise the past arrival of newcomers by emphasising the respect they
showed to the existing inhabitants, often cemented by oﬀers of new
resources like cattle, rain-knowledge or iron-making, or by marriage.
In Equatoria, the original inhabitants are seen as the custodians of the
fertility of the land, ensuring that they have continued to be shown respect
as the land-owners or ‘ landlords ’, even if other leadership roles have been
taken by ‘ immigrant ’ clans (e.g. Buxton 1963). Some of the original land-
owning clans have themselves migrated in recent times to other areas, but
they continue to be called upon to perform important rituals in their
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original territories. Their ritual invocations frequently begin with the
conditional clause, ‘ If this land is ours ’, any eﬃcacy thus conﬁrming their
land rights.
It has been common for people to move to the lands of their maternal
relatives if necessary, and the inhabitants of clan territories or chiefdoms
are by no means all related by blood (Buxton 1963; Retired politician 1
int. ; Whitehead 1962). Even chiefs are not necessarily related paternally to
the dominant lineage, since it was common for adopted dependents to
take the risk of mediating government forces in the early colonial period,
rather than the senior clan leaders (Leonardi 2007a). Nevertheless, an
idiom of patrilineal kinship continues to structure inter- and intra-clan
relations and hierarchies, reinforced in strictly ordered distribution of
meat and drink during social and ceremonial events.
However, as pressure for and the value of land has increased in recent
years, members of the land-owning clans complain that they are increas-
ingly disregarded in land transactions, and variously blame local govern-
ment oﬃcials, chiefs or other community leaders for allocating land to
organisations or businesses without consulting them. As a result there have
been intense intra-clan or intra-community debates over land, often along
generational lines. According to one chief in Kajokeji, the landlords have
been losing power recently because ‘sons want to make money from the
land’.13 Around Yei, it was conversely the organised youth of some clans
who were protesting at the sale of land by their elders and chiefs in 2005–7.
In both cases though, the debate centres on whether clan land can be sold
for money.
The response of at least some senior clan members has been to seek to
restrict their allocation of individual plots to patrilineal relations, as one
politician from a land-owning clan explained:
Most people living now in [clan territory near Yei] are our sisters’ children,
people from broken homes – some are not even Kakwa. So we have to say who
has the right to exist there. We will get all the clan, even those who are abroad,
and make a list. And it will be done [sub]clan by [sub]clan.
Politician 1 int.
Around Juba, some chiefs have reportedly been allocating plots to
Equatorians to the exclusion of other groups, ‘particularly Dinka’
(Pantuliano et al. 2008: 30). But the debates over land reach beneath their
ethnic dimensions to connect with generational tensions and changing
relations between maternal and paternal kinship, as revealed in the reac-
tionary attempts to restrict land to agnatic rather than aﬃnal or assimilative
blood relations.14
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By focusing on the alleged claims that land has been ‘bought ’ with blood,
the Equatorians cited in this paper are apparently conﬂating a debate over
whether land rights should be based on wartime eﬀort, nationality or
ethnicity, or on use, occupancy or autochthony, with a deeper debate
taking place both within their communities and more widely across
Southern Sudan over perceived threats to patriclan and familial control of
key productive resources. Their rhetoric connects with wider vernacular
concerns at the monetisation and commodiﬁcation of resources and rela-
tions that were previously excluded from the money economy (cf. Shipton
2007). Just as the buckets of blood imply the commodiﬁcation of human
life, so the sale of land essentially involves the conversion of blood relations
into money, something which has been resisted or regulated in the past
(cf. Weiss 1996: 194–5).
D E B A T I N G M O N E T I S A T I O N
One elderly professor from Central Equatoria claimed that ‘ this thing
of using blood to get land only happens in the town, not in the village’
(Professor 2 int.). Southern Sudanese have long sought out the opportu-
nities and resources of towns and government, even when this entailed
considerable risk. They have also integrated money into household and
community economies, as Hutchinson (1996: 57) shows in detail for the
Nuer; there has not been a simple opposition or ‘barrier ’ to conversion
between cash and cattle. Yet most people still subscribe to the discourse
that depicts towns, government and money as an alien, exclusive and
individualistic economy. Lineage and family authorities have therefore
succeeded in retaining some control over the productive and reproductive
resources that earn social status and capital, by resisting their straightfor-
ward commensurability with money. The paradox is not simply a disparity
between discourse and practice, or ideology and reality, because the moral
discourse continues to exert limits on the status of monetary wealth and to
elicit investment in the productive economy of cattle, land and marriage.
This is in turn because the discourse evokes memories and experiences of
the volatility of the monetary economy of the urban government centres,
leading people to convert money into more reliable and productive forms
of value. These conversions are the focus of tensions and moral debates, as
revealed not only in discussion of land sales, but also of bridewealth.
Since its colonial inception from the 1920s, the money economy has
appeared to oﬀer the potential for individuals to earnwealth independently,
as well as for families to diversify their income sources. But this potential
independence has been restricted by marriage practices that have
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preserved the authority of senior male relatives over reproduction, even as
junior men and women have often gained greater economic power than
their elders (Huby 1981). As money became integrated into local and
household economies, it gradually became the main component of the
bridewealth in certain areas. But this has been countered by the continuing
role of senior men in negotiating, legalising and blessing marriages, still
marked above all by the exchange of the non-money bridewealth com-
ponents, such as iron hoes; money is merely said to ‘cover the hoes ’ to
facilitate their acceptance. Marriage negotiations emphasise the represen-
tative rather than actual value of money, carefully itemised to indicate
amounts for ‘opening the gate ’, or for ‘ the father’s stick’, or for speciﬁc
items like hoes, spears or livestock (see also Reining 1966: 94). The
appearance of a monetisation of the marriage exchange has thus been
avoided, and people criticise high monetary demands by parents as akin
to ‘selling their daughter ’, because of their blatant conversion of social,
kinship and reproductive values directly into money.
In many cattle-keeping areas, even money-earning young men still re-
main dependent on their families to pay their cattle bridewealth, because
the number and cost of cattle required is too high for them to purchase; in
other words the local economy has maintained the stronger value of cattle
relative to money, in favour of senior generations (cf. Ferguson 1985: 666).
Resistance to monetary bridewealth has continued up to now, as a young
woman near Juba explained: ‘We can’t marry with money, because all the
bridewealth has to be shared out among the relatives. Money can be
hidden in the pocket, but cows have to be seen! ’ (Pastoralist woman int.)
Many people comment on the individualising eﬀects of money and the
way that it can be secretly negotiated and ‘pocketed’, thus denying and
excluding the wider relations of reciprocal obligation and ‘entrustment ’
that Shipton (2007) explores in Kenya. The individualising eﬀects and
alternative values of urban life were the subject of Dinka songs translated
by Mading Deng (1984: 162) which criticised the coins of the town for
diminishing the ‘value ’ of family so that ‘blood ties have been severed in
the pockets ’. It is not that there are two distinct money and kinship
economies, but rather that a moral opposition has been preserved between
the value of family and the value of money.
As well as explaining that money can too easily be hidden in the pocket
rather than invested in social relations, people also frequently refer to
money being ‘eaten’ to indicate selﬁsh, secretive forms of consumption
(cf. Broch-Due 1999: 59). Yet they are also quick to point out that money
was useless to people living in the bush during the war, because they could
not eat it. The frequently low purchasing power of money in general has
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ensured that even money-earners have often depended on rural relatives
for subsistence. And wartime disruption and market shortages or collapses
have recurrently rendered money entirely useless, as colonial oﬃcials ﬁrst
reported in the 1940s, despairing of their eﬀorts to promote monetisation
and market trade (NRO 1944). In the popular imagination, the apparent
capacity of urban elites to ‘eat ’ money is therefore mysterious and dis-
turbing.
In the last decade, the exclusive and illusive nature of money (cf. Weiss
1996: 135–6) has been underscored even as its use has become ever more
widespread, because of the often invisible international connections of
Southern Sudan’s economy. The perceived inﬂation of bridewealth,
whether measured in cattle or money, is attributed to the dollars gained by
a new elite of government and aid agency employees, or from diaspora
remittances :
Marriage has been spoiled … The millions [for bridewealth] have started in
Garang’s time. During the war, there was no money; the money has increased
due to those boys abroad aﬀecting us here in the country, who have no money.
Church elder int.
As refugees and IDPs return to Southern towns, increasing numbers are
dependent on the money economy, which in turn opens up greater dif-
ferentiation between those with and without cash incomes. As in the
1970s–80s, high unemployment, price inﬂation and limited economic ac-
tivity disappoint the high expectations people have of urban opportunities
(Hill 1981 ; Martin & Mosel 2011). Urban crime is blamed on enlarging
impoverished town populations (e.g. Mayar 2008). Around Rumbek,
people criticise increasing inequality and individualistic consumption
practices in the town, as one chief explained:
You [the local translator] and me are not equal. The UN brought education,
smart clothes, so you know how to talk to foreigners, and now each person has his
own small bowl instead of sharing from one dish. This is a new thing of the young
men.
Chief 3 int.
Criticism of money and concern about the inﬂation of monetary bride-
wealth is part of wider discussion about the perceived decline of a redis-
tributive economy. An elderly widow in Rumbek similarly bemoaned the
eﬀects of monetary employment in eroding social obligation:
This is the generation of money: they don’t listen to us elders, or plan for the
future, or give anything to us. When we were young, our parents advised us how
to bring cattle : boys were told how to ﬁnd cattle, and girls were told to be careful
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so they would be married well. The educated people should bring us good things,
but they just waste money.
Elder 1 int.
Such complaints belie, and perhaps produce, the reality that ‘educated
people ’ do in fact reinvest their earnings in kinship networks and pro-
ductive resources. Nowadays a recurring topic of conversation among
employees of government and international agencies is the pressure they
face from rural relatives to provide school or hospital fees, clothes and
other commodities, and to continually disprove the suspicion that ‘ the
educated’ are selﬁsh, alien or, at worst, practitioners of witchcraft. Yet
even as they seek to convert their monetary resources into the moral
economy of family and village, they are perpetuating the prevailing
dichotomies by investing in the values of town in the form of school fees
and commodity items.
The moral criticisms of money thus have the paradoxical eﬀect of both
eliciting its redistribution and perpetuating its conﬁnement to a speciﬁc
urban value system and set of uses. Despite their relative economic power,
money-earners have therefore remained marginal in the local social and
moral order. The expectations of their relatives are always higher than
their actual earnings, and their status remains vulnerable in an economy of
frequently unpaid salaries. Everyone depends on money to some extent,
and yet virtually everyone has an interest in playing down or criticising the
importance of money as a measure of human value.
T U R N I N G B L O O D I N T O M O N E Y : T H E G O V E R N M E N T E C O N O M Y
The contrasts that many Southern Sudanese draw between money and
kinship values are particularly apparent when they discuss compensation
for human life. Even more than with bridewealth, people have resisted a
monetisation of blood-compensation payments, because of the implication
that ‘ it is selling your brother’ (Chief 1 int.). Where possible, cattle are
given as blood-wealth because they are seen as productive of human life
and social relations (Mading Deng 1998; Hutchinson 1996) ; otherwise,
people have largely refused to accept blood-money in the belief that it
instead brings disease and pollution into the family (Retired politician 2
int. ; Moro, pers. comm. 2010; Nalder 1937: 43–5; NRO 1943–5). This is
why the commodiﬁcation of human life in ‘buckets of blood’ is such
a potent rhetorical device. And – even if unintentionally – it is revealing of
a transethnic popular perception of the eﬀects of war and a shared mem-
ory of the ‘government’ economy that stretches back to the brutally
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extractive commercial and military incursions of the nineteenth century.
Human life appears to have been commodiﬁed on a vast scale by the
economy of the recent war, from which the top military oﬃcers are
commonly believed to have proﬁted. But this evokes a longer history of
the apparent capacity of government to extract and consume productive
resources, or, in the bluntest formulation, to turn blood into money.
The cultures of the army and towns trace their origins to the nineteenth-
century military stations (zara’ib ; sing. zariba) of ivory- and slave-traders
and the Turco-Egyptian government (Johnson 1992). Described as ‘para-
sitic ’ on the surrounding countryside, the zara ’ib and Egyptian garrisons
depended on raiding the population for ivory, slaves and cattle. Local
people drawn into their orbit were themselves turned into slaves, soldiers
or raiders (Gessi 1892: 84–5). Schweinfurth (1873 II : 427) categorised the
zariba inhabitants as ‘consumers’ and the surrounding population as
‘producers ’, a distinction which has endured in perceptions of urban
economies ; contrasts are still drawn between shared and ordered con-
sumption practices within families, and the greedy, selﬁsh consumption of
government and townspeople. Schweinfurth (1873 I : 92; II : 169) also
commented on the ‘enormous consumption’ of raided cattle in the zara ’ib.
The original cattle-owners would only have killed their cattle for con-
sumption during famine, and it is still commonly considered shameful
even to sell cattle in order to purchase food.
The predatory and extractive character of nineteenth-century com-
mercial and military incursions remains powerful in Southern Sudanese
memory. One elder from Central Equatoria linked the recent bloodshed
of the war to this longer history: ‘The blood has never stopped ever since
the Turks came and captured people … and sold them as slaves … The
blood did not stop so this is just another phase, and the blood goes on
(Elder 2 int.). Another interviewee from the same area based his assertion
of primary land rights on a long history of defending the land against
government appropriation: ‘This land, we have poured blood for it from
our great, great-grandfathers ; since the Mahdiyya and Turkiyya, we have
poured blood … to protect the land’ (Professor 1 int.).
The colonial administrations of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium of
Sudan and the short-lived Belgian Lado Enclave appeared little diﬀerent
from their predecessors, launching their own raids to exact ‘ tribute ’
from the population. One British report on the Lado Enclave declared
that the inhabitants ‘are sick to death of the blood-sucking that has been
going on … the natives are beginning to realise that everything is being
taken out of their country and nothing new substituted’ (NRO 1905). Over
time the ‘blood-sucking’ became less literal, but the British colonial
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government continued to extract resources and labour from rural econ-
omies.
Soldiers and government employees began to form urban settlements
around the government stations, which in turn attracted individuals from
the surrounding area. But colonial administrators and local people alike
viewed these emerging urban populations with mistrust and derision,
the British seeing them as dangerously ‘detribalised’, and local society
associating them with theft, vice and dishonesty – in other words as stand-
ing outside the rural moral communities. Recruitment of individuals into
government employment, education and army would continue to involve
their perceived extraction from kinship society and transformation into a
town or ‘educated’ person: ‘All our educated boys … go to town and stay
there ’ (Golooba-Mutebi & Mapuor 2005; see also Hutchinson 1996;
Cormack 2010).
The economy of the urban government centres also became ﬁrmly as-
sociated with money, particularly as the colonial administration demanded
taxes in cash; in Dinka the word for money, weu, is the same as for taxes
(NRO c. 1939). As one chief near Yei stated simply, ‘money belongs to the
Government’ (Chief 4 int.). Or, as Blunt (2004: 321) declares in the case
of Kenya, ‘money is the ubiquitous and unavoidable symbol of the state ’.
In Southern Sudan this association has been reinforced by the very limited
commercial development and continuing dominance of the economy by
the public sector (Cook 2008; Hill 1981). Government (and, more recently,
international agency) employment has been the main source of monetary
income since the colonial period.Commercial success has tended to depend
on access to markets and ﬁnance beyond Southern Sudan, giving
Khartoum or Ugandan traders an advantage over local traders. National
development has meanwhile focused on appropriating land for mech-
anised agriculture in the north-south border areas, or extracting natural
resources – most recently, and proﬁtably, oil.
This history of marginalisation and extractive government was the main
justiﬁcation for the SPLA rebellion from 1983. But Southern Sudanese
often interpret the war as a struggle among government people – the ‘war
of the educated’ (Hutchinson 2001: 320) – driven by hunger for money.
Although the SPLA was distinguished from the Khartoum government as
the government ‘of the bush’ or ‘of our sons’, its vernacular nomenclature
remained the same, denoting foreign and military origins (Leonardi
2007a). In popular discussion of the causes of war, money is again ascribed
a power of its own to corrupt and to destroy relations of kinship: ‘Even if
you are brothers then you kill each other. Because of money, we are told to
ﬁght. We are eating money, and this is the cause which brought war’
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(Teacher 1 int.). Inhabitants of the government garrison town of Juba
similarly blamed money for tempting people into informing on their own
relatives and friends to security forces, so that ‘ the collaborators ate our
blood’ (Badiey, pers. comm. 2008; Elder 3 int.).
The proﬁts of war are often described as ‘blood-money’ in a conﬂation
of an international idiom with the indigenous dislike of monetary blood-
compensation (e.g. Gordon 2009). One story recounted in Wau tells of a
Shilluk military oﬃcer who allegedly received compensation from the
Khartoum government for civilians killed in his home area during the war,
whose relatives had refused to accept blood-money. The oﬃcer is said to
have died subsequently, because of ‘eating their blood’ (Returnee int.).
Another man in Wau explained that ‘our people thought that if you kill
my brother and give me a lot of money and I accept, then what I eat is like
eating the blood of my brother ’ (Politician 3 int.).
The equations drawn between money, blood and eating in such stories
suggest that money is seen to mediate the consumption of the blood of the
people, with potentially dangerous spiritual consequences. In other African
countries, the mysteries and falsities of neo-liberal capitalism have been
expressed in popular accounts of individuals who could turn human blood
into money (Apter 2005: 251; Blunt 2004; Weiss 1996: 202–7). There
are parallels in Southern Sudanese accounts of occult wealth-generation
(Kibego 2005; Leonardi 2007b). But the conversion of blood into money
does not necessarily require such supernatural powers, in the context of
the recent war.
Like the nineteenth-century military economy, the war since 1983
alienated productive resources and human life from the rural areas and
lineage control on a massive scale, not least through the conscription of
young soldiers (Leonardi 2007c). Military commanders also encouraged
raiding for cattle and the ‘steady siphoning’ of civilian assets into their
hands (Jok & Hutchinson 1999: 133; Walraet 2008). Johnson (2003: 166)
describes the ‘highly individualised economic policy ’ of the SPLM/A,
whose leaders were able to ‘ strike deals of their own’, and control the
export trade in livestock, timber and minerals. As in the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, the primary role of chiefs reverted to provi-
sioning armies with food and recruits in order to deﬂect worse depreda-
tions: ‘We collect a lot of money and food for the government but we get
nothing in return … these things go into the stomach of a crocodile ’
(Rumbek chief, cited in Golooba-Mutebi & Mapuor 2005).
There are commonly recounted tales of military oﬃcers who gorged
themselves on entire goats during the war, while their bodyguards
watched hungrily. This is a vivid caricature of unproductive patronage,
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and the kind of individualistic consumption associated more generally
with the money economy and the government. Such behaviour would
have set the oﬃcers ‘outside the consumption patterns ’ of the local
civilians from whom they seized the goats (cf. Alexander & McGregor
2005: 81–2).
Apter’s (2005: 273) description of Nigeria as a ‘vampire state ’, ‘ in which
the production of false value equals the consumption of human blood’,
invites obvious comparison with Southern Sudanese discourse. Since
2005, the frequently observed lack of any constructive manifestation of the
anticipated peace dividend, the ﬂimsiness of the elite economy of tent-
hotels, and the instability of salaries, banks and currency, seemed to
epitomise the false value of the government economy.15 A particularly
dramatic allegory was reported in 2008, when a vulture vomited ‘a litre ’ –
another commodity measure – of blood right next to a state governor’s
oﬃce and its ﬂags. The local news reporter noted that vultures feed on
ﬂesh, including that of humans, and that the Sudanese national coat of
arms features a vulture, before quoting people on the streets who were
interpreting the unusual event to mean ‘end of suﬀering’. According to a
local student, ‘ this bird used to feed on our blood while struggling in the
bush. It is now regretting and that is why it has to come and vomit the
blood it took from innocent people ’ (Biar 2008). The Sudanese state,
whose national symbol of a secretary bird is here – mistakenly but aptly –
believed to be a vulture, has proven less regretful.
Beneath any competition between ethnic groups, returnees, soldiers and
civilians to claim the greatest right to the ‘peace dividend’, there is a core
concern with the perceived extraction and consumption of human life and
productive resources by the forces of government(s) during the war, and
with the historical patterns this evokes. The predatory nature of the
government economy since the nineteenth century has been a pretext for
people to create rural refuges from it and to preserve alternative economic
and social structures (cf. Giblin 2005). But the seizure of land in Equatoria
seems to represent the expansion and penetration of the predatory
government economy into these rural economies. One chief responded
angrily to reports that land in his rural chiefdom was being taken by
soldiers of a prominent Southern militia leader : ‘How can these brothers
of ours just take land like that? At least the Arabs just stayed in their
barracks and didn’t try to take land’ (Chief 2 int.). The desire to keep
the predatory economy of government conﬁned to its barracks is a long-
standing one, but Southern Sudanese have found a new language in
recent years in which to criticise government: the international discourse
of ‘corruption’.
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S T A T E , K I N A N D T H E R O O T S O F C O R R U P T I O N
In the aftermath of war and continuing uncertainties of the peace process,
popular criticism of the vulture-like tendencies of government is tempered
by the strong desire for self-determination in Southern Sudan, understood
in simple terms as gaining independence from the ‘enemy’ in Khartoum.
Nevertheless, there has been growing criticism of GoSS corruption, voiced
everywhere from the cattle-camps and tea shops to the newspapers and
parliaments.16 This paper attempts an analysis, not of the veracity or
extent of corruption, but rather of some of the popular discourse about it,
which focuses on the ‘eating’ of government money, and the nepotism
and tribalism by which the majority of people feel excluded from access
to government oﬃces and resources.
At ﬁrst glance these are familiar litanies of corruption. They correspond
to wider analyses of African governance and politics that stress patri-
monialism as a systemwith its own socio-cultural logic andmoral economy,
which is in turn a much-mutated version of indigenous, deep-rooted pol-
itical cultures. The reciprocal obligation between patron and client at the
core of these cultures is said to have been denied and distorted in the
neopatrimonialism of the post-colonial state, leading to the widespread
popular condemnation of corruption. Nevertheless, some analysts argue,
there is a replication of vernacular political culture and the relations of
household and village at the level of the state (Bayart 1993; Berman 2004;
Chabal 2009; Chabal & Daloz 1999; Olivier de Sardan 1999).17 De Waal
(2009) argues for the applicability of Bayart’s analysis to Sudan, particularly
in terms of the compatibility of lineage and state, and ‘ the way in which
formal political systems and processes are intermingled with kinship’.
It is easy to see reported corruption in Southern Sudan in these terms,
as indicating the demands on government people to redistribute state re-
sources through networks of kinship and ethnicity. But the moral concerns
apparent in the debates over land are also present in popular discourse on
government corruption, and they actually suggest quite the opposite :
kinship and state are fundamentally distinct moral worlds, even if they are
increasingly connected in everyday practice. As we have seen, the state
and the monetary economy with which it is so strongly associated have
always been understood to operate in remote moral ways. People have
therefore resisted the ‘over-monetisation’ of ‘everyday forms of sociability ’,
which Olivier de Sardan (1999: 45) highlights as a facilitator of corruption.
They draw frequent attention to the large bellies of the big men not as a
productive source of patronage but as a caricature of the unproductive
consumption with which government and the urban money economy are
associated. This ensures that while patronage may be an important form
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of rural–urban and state–society linkage, the status of government patrons
in rural society is simultaneously limited by the moral condemnation of the
source of their wealth and the nature of their consumption.
GoSS explains its major expenditure on civil service and army salaries
in terms of the need to reward its soldiers and civilian supporters (Cook
2008: 70). However, the ambivalence with which people view the state and
its economy ensures that even this form of government patronage is fre-
quently interpreted as part of a wider, unwelcome, expansion of the state,
blamed for the greater inequality and individualisation discussed above,
and for an escalation of local conﬂicts. Many Southern Sudanese people
are adamant that increasing conﬂicts since 2005 – too often labelled
as ‘ tribalist ’ – are the result of political instigation or a new economy of
cattle raids and trade controlled by military oﬃcers, so that ‘ tribal political
vultures would like conﬂict to continue’ (Vuni 2007; see Billy 2005;
Walraet 2008). Similarly, a young man in Rumbek asserted that SPLA
oﬃcers were proﬁting from sales of arms and raided cattle, with a par-
ticularly blunt formulation of the monetisation of human life and kinship
values : ‘The blood of your brother becomes your own money. These
people are like vultures ’ (Teacher 2 int.).
Paradoxically, pressure to pay bridewealth in cattle may also be fuelling
raids (cf. Broch-Due 1999: 85), but the prevailing discourse blames com-
modiﬁcation and political elites. As a recent report also illustrates, rural
people perceive ‘ tribalism’ as something brought by the government
people from the towns and oﬃces, and associated with the intensifying
commercialisation of cattle, another form of unprecedented monetisation
(Schomerus & Allen 2010). Similarly Bari chiefs attribute the politicisation
of land disputes in Juba to the Bari ‘politicians and intellectuals ’ (Deng
2010: 32).
The recent popular concerns in Southern Sudan about both land and
corruption – often expressed in terms of blood being turned into money –
are a manifestation of long-standing ambivalent relations with the state, in
which people seek to make claims on the state’s resources, but simul-
taneously resist its intrusion into their social relations and local economies
because they fear its extractive tendencies. When Equatorians decry the
notion that their land can be bought with the blood of soldiers, they are
not only asserting antecedent land rights against other ethnic groups. At a
deeper level of moral concern, they are resisting the appropriation of the
productive resource of land into the market economy and the penetration
of the military and monetary cultures of government and army into the
rural refuges of kinship and productive relations. In this respect it is the
unprecedented closer proximity of the state to society since the SPLA war
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that is arousing such unease, but this is understood not as the capture of
the state by local cultures and relations, but as the intrusion of the immoral
ways of the government into local society.
: : :
When the late leader of the SPLM/A, Dr John Garang, promised to ‘ take
the towns to the people ’, he meant to extend service delivery to the rural
areas. In 2007 one county commissioner claimed to take up this call by
inviting visiting GoSS oﬃcials ‘deeper into his village’, where he ‘planted
the Southern Sudan ﬂag into the ground’ (Diyan 2007). But the attempt to
plant the state beyond its old urban centres is generating deep tensions
between value systems that have historically been kept separate in moral
terms. In the absence of the promised rural service delivery, many people
have instead taken themselves to the town, following a long tradition
of seeking to access and appropriate the resources of the state and the
associated monetary urban economy. But they have also continued to
subscribe to a discourse which warns of the capacity of this economy to
remove individuals altogether from their social and moral communities
and drive them into selﬁsh and potentially rapacious modes of existence.
In order to resist this process, people have therefore continued to invest in
an alternative, productive and kinship-based, economy and social status
associated with rural communities, even if they are living in the towns.
And they are simultaneously resisting the expansion and encroachment of
the towns into these alternative value systems.
In this context, the debates over alleged claims to Equatorian land on
the basis of buckets of blood poured on it during the war also contain
commentary on broader economic processes and ultimately on the state
itself. Firstly, competition for land around Equatorian towns is perceived
as indicating the wider expansion and penetration of urban, military and
monetary forces into the rural areas, threatening to appropriate and
commodify communal land. Secondly, the very notion of blood in buckets
raises the disturbing implication of the commodiﬁcation of human life
itself, a process historically associated with the same economy in which
government and military have their roots. Condemnation of the con-
sumption and monetisation of human blood during and since the war is
shared across ethnic and livelihood divides.
Over a decade ago, Tripp (1997: 172) emphasised the peculiar resilience
of the political structures of state and society in Sudan:
This should serve as a warning to anyone who thinks either that the attitudes
which have historically been associated with those structures can be changed
MORA L D E B A T E S I N S OUTHERN SUD AN 235
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 25 May 2011 IP address: 129.234.252.67
overnight, or that a formal change in the constitutional rules of the game can
redress the imbalances at the heart of the Sudanese state project.
Southern Sudanese discourse reveals a common awareness of just this
resilience: however hopeful they are of a potential independent state,
Southern Sudanese also perceive their current government in the context
of the historical patterns from which it has emerged. This might seem
a pessimistic note to strike now as Southern Sudan looks forward to
a popular referendum and potential independence. But much recent
commentary has also been pessimistic, and it has directed greatest criti-
cism at so-called ‘ tribal ’ divisions and conﬂicts, and at the generalised
‘corruption’ of the new government. The problem for Southern Sudan is
not, however, primarily one of ethnicity, nor of the patrimonial demands
of indigenous social and cultural norms. It is an enduring problem of the
government economy. The military project that has produced the new
government was ostensibly a struggle to overturn the entrenched pattern
of an extractive, centralising and remote state. But from the popular per-
spective, the decades of war instead expanded and intensiﬁed those pat-
terns, turning the blood of the people into money to be consumed in selﬁsh
ways. Collective memories in Southern Sudan suggest that the roots of the
government economy are to be found in the nineteenth-century zariba, not
in the village. Understanding the resulting ambivalence that people feel
towards towns, money and the state is vital in order to move beyond the
prevalent ﬁxation with ethnic divisions in Southern Sudan. It is in the
common desire to protect the social relations and productive economy of
family, village and cattle-camp from the expanding, corrupting forces of
predatory government that a shared Southern Sudanese culture and
memory is most apparent.
N O T E S
1. Politician 1 (int. : in English, quoting colloquial Arabic statement) ; see also Lo-Lumori (2006),
Rolandsen (2009: 25).
2. The category of ‘Equatorians ’ encompasses multiple ethnicities, languages and livelihoods in the
old province or region of Equatoria (now divided into three states) ; the Dinka are the largest ethno-
linguistic grouping in Southern Sudan, made up of many diﬀerent sections. For the history of the war
between (and among) the SPLA and the Government of Sudan, see Collins 2008; Johnson 2003;
Rolandsen 2005.
3. There are many examples in Sudanese news sources, e.g. Sudan Tribune. For recent examples of
pessimistic and simplistic international reporting see The Economist 11.6.2009, 6.5.2010. For an example
of Equatorian media comment see Lupai 2008. On ‘tribalist ’ conﬂict and corruption see e.g. Adeba
2009; HRW 2006, 2009; McVeigh 2009.
4. For deeper critical analysis see Rolandsen 2009; Schomerus & Allen 2010.
5. See Weiss (1996: 173–6) for a deeper discussion of plastic containers as a particular epitome of the
commodity form in Tanzania.
6. See the excellent analysis of the local and national politics of land administration in Juba by
Badiey 2010; also Deng 2010.
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7. For an earlier internal criticism of the ‘ liberation’ struggle see Nyaba 1997. The politics of the
language of ‘ liberation’ is discussed comparatively in Dorman 2006.
8. For a critical analysis of the ‘Dinka domination’ idea see Johnson 2003: 51–5.
9. According to Collins (2008: 136), these tensions can be traced back to the herding of Dinka cattle
into Equatoria following the ﬂoods of the 1960s. See also Badiey 2010: 342.
10. The Kakwa are one of the Bari-speaking groups of Central Equatoria State.
11. Interview with a chief by Leben Nelson Moro, Kajokeji, 17.11.09, cited in Leonardi et al. (2010:
59).
12. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for emphasising this possibility.
13. Court case 13.1.10, Kajokeji : Moro, pers. comm. 2010.
14. See assimilative versus exclusive blood-based deﬁnitions of kinship and ethnicity in Hutchinson
& Jok (2002: 96). See also Branch & Mampilly 2005: 12, Johnson 2003: 172–3 and Leonardi 2007a on
the rigidifying of ethnically deﬁned ‘communities ’.
15. E.g. Costa 2007; Toure Pouch 2006; Sudan Tribune 2010. See also Schomerus & Allen 2010.
16. See many examples at www.sudantribune.com and in Cook 2007, 2008.
17. See critiques such as Clapham 1994, and most recently the collected comments on Chabal
(2009) in Critical African Studies 2, 2009.
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